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Abstract
In this paper, we examine long-run determinants of cross-country variation in reserve
volatility for 30 emerging market economies from 1973 to 2000. Reserve holdings and
openness are found to be the most important explanatory variables of reserve volatility.
The empirical results are robust for a range of control variables, including monetary
variables, the degree of financial development, and the level of indebtedness. We view
these results as establishing interesting stylized facts that may be helpful in evaluating
reserve volatility as a crisis indicator.
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Introduction
The importance of reserve volatility arises frequently in policy discussions of
international finance. Aizenman and Marion (2002) argue that a high level of reserve
volatility can reduce international credit if such information signals a more pessimistic
outlook about a country's ability to fulfil its debt obligations. Reserve volatility is also
used to identify events or regimes. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) construct an index of
currency market turbulence measured as a weighted average of exchange rate changes and
reserve changes. In their index, reserve volatility enters as a weight for reserve loss.
Alternatively, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999) rely on
reserve volatility to determine whether the official classifications of a country's exchange
rate arrangement provides an adequate representation of actual country practice.
 Until now, empirical studies using reserve volatility concentrate on the indicator
properties of reserve volatility as a signal to identify specific events in the short run.
When reserve volatility for a particular country exceeds an exogenous threshold, the
defined indicator model signals an exchange rate crisis or a debt crisis. The fear-of-
floating hypothesis of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) or the international credit problem
analyzed by Aizenman and Marion (2002) assume that reserve volatility is associated with
credibility problems and if left unchecked can spillover into a crisis. Missing in the
empirical literature on reserve volatility is a long-run perspective that tries to understand
the cross-country differences in reserve volatility.
Our contribution is to determine whether long-run factors are important in
explaining reserve volatility. The question is of importance because long-run factors have
not been considered in the indexes of Levy Yeyati-Sturzenegger (1999) or Calvo and
Reinhart (2002) when making comparative statements about a country's fluctuations in
reserves. It is imaginable that certain variables such as openness are positively correlated
with reserve volatility. If this is the case then the omitted variables need to be accounted
for when indicator models based on reserve volatility are used to predict exchange rate
crises or regime changes.3
A plot of the monthly percentage change in foreign exchange reserves of twelve
leading emerging market countries in Figure 1 reveals that it is difficult to make
generalizations about reserve volatility across countries. The largest fluctuations for the
post-Bretton Woods era are not always concentrated around the time of well-known
episodes such as the Asian Crisis of 1997. Nor is it clear whether the fluctuations have
increased or decreased over the three decades. From a cross-country perspective, it is of
interest to learn whether long-run factors are responsible for the differing behavior in
reserve volatility or whether it is simply noise.
1
To test the hypothesis that reserve volatility is influenced by long-run factors, the
empirical methodology uses a cross-country setup. The empirical analysis focuses on 30
emerging market economies. A wide range of potential indicators stemming from the
currency crisis literature is considered for the 1973-2000 period. A key finding is that the
level of reserves and openness are important contributing factors for reserve volatility.
More important, these variables are not necessarily linked to monetary policy or financial
development; i.e., variables that the currency crisis literature has emphasized.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews the implications of
reserve volatility for emerging market economies. In particular, it discusses theoretical
and empirical priors about reserve volatility. Section 2 defines the empirical strategy:
measures of reserve volatility, the economic determinants of reserve volatility, and the
empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the main cross-country findings for the long-
run factors. Section 4 considers specifications with the long-run factors together with the
crisis and regime variables to test the robustness of the empirical findings from the
previous section. Section 5 considers whether the cross-country results based on averaged
data hold equally for panel estimates based on annual data. Section 6 offers concluding
remarks for practitioners that use reserve volatility as an indicator variable.
                                        
1 Several studies including Neely (2000) and Lee (1997) suggest that reserves are an imperfect proxy for
foreign exchange interventions or other transactions such as government payment of debt denominated in
foreign currency.4
1. Reserve Volatility and Theoretical Priors
The intention of this section is to highlight how reserve volatility enters the
different discussions of international finance. While there are an infinite number of
channels that can generate fluctuations in reserve holdings, to our knowledge there is no
explicit theoretical model that seeks to explain reserve volatility as a macroeconomic
policy objective.
2 Moreover, central banks have been quiet as to how reserve volatility
should behave. The smoothing or minimization of reserve volatility is not regarded to be
an objective of central banks.
3 Reserve volatility enters, however, as a contributing factor
in various theoretical and empirical models. In each of these cases, reserve volatility acts
as a causal variable to explain another variable or to predict a specific event.
Theoretical Links
One economic linkage involving reserve volatility is through the transaction models
of money demand used to determine the optimal size of a country's international reserves.
The buffer stock model of Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) says that central banks choose an
optimal level of reserves to balance the macroeconomic adjustment costs incurred in the
absence of reserves with the opportunity cost of holding reserves. The optimal stock of
reserves yields the optimal combination of being able to finance a deficit by drawing on
reserves and of having to adjust in the face of a deficit by reducing expenditures relative
to income. Higher reserve volatility means that reserves hit their lower bound more
frequently. The monetary authority is therefore willing to restock a larger amount of
reserves and tolerate greater opportunity costs to incur the adjustment cost less
frequently.
                                        
2 The strategic objectives for reserve management are generally defined as maximizing returns subject to the
maintenance of sufficient security of the assets and adequate liquidity for meeting the calls on reserves, see
Nugée (2000).
3 Central banks, in rare instances, set guidelines to motivate their demand for reserves. The Guidotti plan,
for example, sought to set reserves at a level equivalent to a year's interest payment on foreign debt. See
the Report of the Working Group on Transparency and Accountability (1998).
www.ustres.gov/press/releases/docs/g22-wg1.htm. Alternatively, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand sets
reserves at 10 weeks of imports (see Sherwin, 2000).5
An alternative channel involving reserve volatility is through signaling. Moral
hazard problems linked with domestic bailouts and credit availability have been cited by
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998) and others as an important determinant of the Asian
financial crisis. Aizenman and Marion (2002) show that reserve uncertainty can have
nonlinear effects on the supply of credit for an emerging market economy. The authors
assume that the private sector believes the domestic authority of an emerging market
country will use its international reserves to bailout lenders. When the expected reserve
position of an emerging market economy is large relative to the potential bailout in bad
states of nature, reserve volatility does not matter. However, the same level of reserve
volatility can cause a large reduction in the supply of international credit if the emerging
market's foreign debt is large enough or if the collapse of output forces the private sector
to downgrade its priors about repayment possibilities.
A further use of reserve volatility is to identify an exchange rate system. Pegged
exchange-rate arrangements have been blamed for many of the currency crises in the last
decade. Adherents of this view argue that emerging market economies should allow their
currency to float freely. To test whether countries are doing what they are professing,
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Reinhart (2002) analyze the behavior of exchange rates,
international reserves, and monetary aggregates within a simple open economy model. A
symptom of 'fear of floating' (i.e., saying that a country allows their exchange rate to
float, but does not), is associated with high reserve volatility.
Each of the above linkages assumes that the monetary authority exercises
considerable control over its reserves and reserve volatility. Others such as Lee (1997)
argue that the opposite is closer to the truth. Monetary authorities of emerging market
economies do not possess the necessary open market instruments to sterilize reserves
when inflation or money growth is their policy objective. This is because their financial
markets are underdeveloped. Supplementary tools, which include tightening the access of
banks at the discount window, adjusting reserve requirements or the placement of
government deposits, and using foreign exchange swap facility, yield the same effect as
an open market operation. In practice, however, reserves become noisier and their
interpretation more difficult.6
Empirical Stylized Facts and Considerations
Flood and Marion (2001) and Lane and Burke (2001) offer cross-country evidence
on reserve holdings that have relevance for the empirical specification of reserve
volatility. Both studies consider industrial and non-industrial countries for relatively long
time periods. The first study, restricting itself to the buffer stock framework of Frenkel and
Jovanovic (1981), finds that reserve volatility is the only significant variable. Different
measures of opportunity cost have little or no explanatory power. The second study does
not consider reserve volatility among its list of potential variables and finds that openness
is the most important contributing factor for reserve demand. For our purposes, it is of
interest to determine whether the combination of openness and reserves unfolds any
other linkages with reserve volatility.
An alternative channel that needs to be considered is the role of financial
development. Recent studies by Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) and Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999) emphasize the interaction between currency crises and banking crises. The "twin
crises" arise as a result of an internal or external shock that is amplified and propagated
to the rest of the economy by liquidity creating financial intermediaries. The
intermediaries generate large capital inflows, and at the same time, augment the risk of
sudden capital outflows. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show empirically that the twin
crises have their origin in the deregulation of the financial system. Financial liberalization
is followed by a rapid increase in the M2 multiplier and in credit growth. Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999) and Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) also show that this trend in the financial
variables reverses abruptly before the outbreak of the currency crisis.
This last linkage underscores the view that the currency crises of the 1990s are
fundamentally different from earlier periods. Feldstein (2002), Perrault (2002) and others
note the evolution of different banking channels and private capital flows between the
1970s and 1990s. First, private capital flows to the emerging market countries were
concentrated in Latin America in the 1970s and the 1980s. During the 1990s, the
emerging market economies in Asia and Europe were the new destinations. Second, high
expected returns on investment motivated capital flows to emerging market countries. In
the 1990s, these flows were boosted by economic and financial liberalization, perceived7
sound macroeconomic policies and, in some cases, explicit or implicit government
guarantees. These recent developments suggest that it is important even in a cross-
country context to account for shifts in the potential linkages over time.
2. Empirical Specifications, Data and Selected Variables
This section defines the empirical strategy used to determine the contributing
factors that explain reserve volatility in the long run.
Cross Country Sample
There is considerable controversy as to what constitutes an emerging market
economy. Definitions vary considerably and few studies motivate their selection. Our
selection was guided by two considerations that are independent of the occurrence of a
crisis episode. The first was data availability that covered the post-Bretton Woods period
from 1973 to 2000. This eliminated many of the so-called economies in transition,
creating a geographical vacuum for Eastern Europe. The second consideration was based
on investment opportunities in the non-industrialized world. This is indirectly measured
by foreign direct investment (FDI). Our selected sample of emerging market economies
was thus defined as the top 30 non-industrialized countries that received FDI from 1973
to 2000.
4 A list of the countries included in the sample can be found in Appendix A1.
Econometric Model
We estimate a cross-sectional specification using data averaged over different time
periods. The motivation for the estimation strategy rests in investigating whether specific
control variables are important in explaining reserve volatility in the long run. Thus, we
intentionally abstract from the cyclical fluctuations in reserves marked by particular
episodes in capital flows or speculative attacks. The cross-country specification follows
                                        
4 Our sample size of 30 countries is set arbitrary. Most empirical studies work with a smaller number of
countries. However, because our estimation strategy is cross country with many control variables, we are
forced to extend the sample to allow for a reasonable number of degrees of freedom.8
Flood and Marion (2001) and Lane and Burke (2001) in their studies for the level of
reserves and is defined as
VolRESi = α  + β Zi + γ Xi + ε i, (1)
where VolRESi is the reserve volatility of country i, Zi is a set of control variables grouped
into the following categories: monetary, external, financial development and structural, Xi
is a set of indicator variables that signal currency and regime crises, and ε i is the error
term. Estimation is by OLS with heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West consistent
covariances.
The hypothesis is the currency crisis literature has overlooked the importance of
certain control variables; i.e., β =≠ =0 .  Because the crises variables, Xi, are averaged, our
prior for these indicator variables in the long-run setup is γ == =0. ==The variables in equation
(1) are averaged over three periods: 1973-1980, 1981-1990 and 1991-2000. The division
into decade averages is motivated by Feldstein (2002). He argues the currency crises of
the 1990s are fundamentally different from earlier periods. Since we are interested in
explaining the long-run fluctuations in reserves, the long-run contributing factors of
reserve volatility should therefore be significant in each of the samples.
Reserve Volatility
The international reserve holdings of a country in this study are defined as foreign
exchange reserves. Although it is common to work with the sum of gold, Special Drawing
Rights, foreign exchange, and reserve position in the Fund, the most important variable in
terms of size and international interest is foreign exchange reserves. This variable is
denominated in end-of-period U.S. dollars.
5 Hereafter, when referring to reserves, we
mean foreign exchange reserves.
Individual country holdings of reserves cannot be compared or traced through time
unless they are scaled in some way to reflect differences in size. Our choice is to scale
                                        
5 Preliminary estimates of the individual components of foreign reserves showed large differences with
foreign exchange reserves offering the most promising results.9
reserves by GDP.
6 Thus, we define the reserve volatility for country i as VolResi = ln(std
dev(∆ Resi,t)/ave(GDPi)), where Resi,t denotes reserves and t time (in months).
Control Variables
The currency crisis literature identifies numerous control variables that may
influence reserves and reserve volatility. Because there is no agreement on the theoretical
model of reserve volatility, a broad approach is taken by considering a large number of
potential empirical determinants. Definitions and sources of the variables are given in
Appendix A2.
Our control variables are grouped into four categories: external, monetary,
financial development, and structural. Our intention is to determine whether a particular
group of variables is more closely associated with reserve volatility. The external
determinants are macroeconomic variables that are strongly influenced by foreign
developments or shocks from abroad. These variables include the level of reserves, foreign
direct investment, exchange rate volatility, the current and capital account, and debt
variables. The classification of reserves and exchange rate volatility as external is without
contention. There are numerous reasons for holding reserves, yet almost all are related to
concerns regarding foreign shocks. Similarly, exchange rate volatility could be grouped as
a monetary variable, yet we assume that external shocks are primarily responsible for
exchange rate fluctuations in emerging markets.
Monetary variables are defined to be instruments that are under the direct control
of the monetary authority. These variables include interest rates and their volatility,
capital controls, and the IMF's classification of exchange rate systems. The impact of the
latter two policy variables is somewhat ambiguous.
7 On the one hand, a flexible exchange
rate system or a high level of capital controls may diminish the risk of a speculative
attack, reducing the need to hold reserves. On the other hand, capital controls may
                                        
6 Recently, Flood and Marion (2001) in their empirical study of the buffer stock model investigate several
scaling methods. Their results are found to be independent of such transformations.
7 As noted in Lane and Burke (2001) in the case of reserves, the monetary variables may be regarded as
endogenous. Yet, we do not believe that the monetary variables are strongly influenced by reserve volatility
over the longer horizon.10
prevent access to external credit sources, increasing the importance of reserves in
financing external transactions. In the case of the exchange rate system, the
classification may be unimportant if the monetary authorities are unable to sterilize the
purchase of domestic currency due to a weak financial system.
The control group defined by financial development includes the dates of financial
innovation, M2/GDP, insurance premium/GDP and insurance premium/population. The first
variable is a dummy variable denoting the date when financial innovation began. This
variable is taken from Bekaerts and Harvey (2000) and assumes that earlier dates
correspond with higher levels of financial development. The money variable scaled by GDP
is frequently used in empirical studies as a measure of credit expansion. Alternatively we
use insurance premia as a broad measure of financial development that goes beyond the
banking system covered by M2 deposits. A higher volume of insurance premia is consistent
with a higher level of financial development.
The structural variables are GDP per capita, population density, openness,
corruption, central bank independence, and country credit rating. These variables reflect
in part institution building (i.e., central bank independence corruption and country credit
rating) that are viewed to be important for a country's long-run development. In the same
spirit, political stability is captured through the country credit rating. While structural
may be an unsatisfactory label for GDP per capita, it enters in this category by mutual
exclusion of the other control categories.
Crisis and Regime Variables
The crisis and regime variables are treated separately from our control variables.
The motivation is twofold. First, studies, such as Calvo and Reinhart (2002), use the crisis
and regime variables to identify events. This is primarily a short-run forecasting exercise,
which depends on indicator variables that are constructed with the help of reserve
volatility. Second, the indicator variables rely on an exogenous threshold level to define
excess reserve fluctuations. The analysis thus defines a country's excess volatility in
reserves to be equal for all countries irrespective of the degree of openness or other
country specific characteristics.11
We rely on two sources for our crisis variables. The first is the Kaminsky-Reinhart
index of currency market turbulence, which is based on monthly changes in the exchange
rate and in reserves.
8 The second source is from Glick and Hutchison (1999). They provide
dates of banking, currency and twin crisis for the years 1975 to 1997.
Fluctuations in reserves are also used to define de facto exchange rate regimes.
The motivation for treating this variable not as a long-run control is the following. The
IMF dejure classifications rarely change over the samples, whereas the defacto
classifications, which are dependent on reserve volatility, exhibit considerable
fluctuations. We test the Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999) index and the Glick and
Wihlborg (1997) measure of exchange rate flexibility. The first index is constructed with
the use of cluster analysis to group different regimes according to changes in the nominal
exchange rate and changes in international reserves. The index has four classifications
(floating = 1, dirty = 2, crawling peg =3, and fixed = 4) for each year from 1990 to 1998.
The Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger index fluctuates considerably from year to year and the
index's analysis is used to identify specific events or regime changes.
The Glick and Wihlborg index is intended to capture the variance of the actual
exchange rate change relative to the variance of the change that would have occurred in
the absence of exchange rate interventions. The index ranges between 0 and 1 and is
constructed with monthly data as in Glick and Wihlborg (1997) for the periods 1973 to
1980, 1981 to 1990, and 1991 to 2000. The exchange rate is fixed if the index yields
values close to 0, that is, if there are no unanticipated changes in the exchange rate or if
the variance of reserve changes is infinity large.
                                        
8 This index is constructed mechanically such that
+1 when |It -  I |/σ I > 3  where It = ∆ et/et-1 - α∆ RESt/RESt-1
and α  = σ e/σ RES,
0 otherwise,
where σ  denotes the standard deviation, et the exchange rate and RES reserves. Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999) filter the data for high inflation periods. Our procedure raises the threshold level for a crisis from 3
to 4 when inflation is more than 150% during a six-month period.12
3. Cross Country Estimates: Some Preliminary Results
This section presents the cross-country estimates of reserve volatility. Because our
prior is the crisis indicators do not influence reserve volatility in the long run, the crisis
variables are intentionally excluded at first. This is done to maintain a respectable number
of degrees of freedom. The next section examines the influence of the crisis variables for
reserve volatility.
The selection strategy examines first the regressions between reserve volatility and
individual determinants. If a control variable on its own is not significant at the 5% level,
it is thrown out. The second phase of the bottom-up strategy looks at whether the
variables in consideration remain significant with other control variables. This strategy is
continued for higher combinations of variables until a satisfactory specification is found.
The search was simplified in that two variables (i.e., reserves and openness) were
able to explain a large share of the cross-country differences in reserve volatility. Table 1
summarizes the empirical regressions. The results show only the regressions of those
variables that were significant with reserve volatility in the first phase of the estimation
strategy (i.e., significant variables in a regression for reserve volatility without additional
control variables). The constant, which is included in each of the regressions, is not
shown in the tables. Because the empirical results are dominated by the inclusion of
reserves, the discussion of the empirical results is divided into two parts: estimates with
and without reserves.
Reserve Volatility and Reserves
The bottom up strategy yielded a parsimonious specification for reserve volatility.
The final specifications were dominated by two or three variables. The control variables
that were significant in the specification search were correctly signed with the priors,
except openness defined by the import-GDP ratio for the 1973-1980 period. For this
sample, the import-GDP ratio is negatively correlated with reserve volatility. The Frankel
and Romer index, Openness (FR) in Table 1, is found to be a better proxy for openness for
the 1973-1980 period, whereas the opposite is true for the import-GDP ratio when
considering the other decades.13
The first phase of the specification strategy was dominated by external and
structural variables. In particular, openness, FDI, and total debt/GDP were found to be
significant for all samples. None of the financial development variables and monetary
variables has a p-value lower than 0.05 for more than one sample.
The second round results yield three main findings. The first finding is that the
level of reserves dominates all other explanatory variables. Reserves explain between 50%
and 70% of the cross-country differences in reserve volatility for the post-Bretton Woods
period. This result says that a country with a high level of reserves is expected to
experience greater reserve volatility. The importance of reserves is not surprising when
considering the empirical results from the risk minimization model of Ben-Bassat (1980)
and the reverse causality results with the buffer stock specification of Flood and Marion
(2001). Both of these studies show that the first two moments of reserves are highly
correlated with each other.
The second finding is that monetary variables and financial development variables
do not enter the final cross-country specification. Monetary variables such as exchange
rate volatility and interest rate volatility are never significant with reserve volatility for
the three samples. Other variables that demonstrate a weak correlation with reserve
volatility (i.e., significant in the first phase for a single decade, but not with other
control variables) are central bank independence, M2/GDP, the amount of insurance
premia/GDP, short-term debt, population density, and exchange rate arrangement, and
country credit ratings.
The third finding is that the empirical specifications for the 1990s differ with
respect to the earlier periods. The level of reserves as an explanatory variable does not
explain reserve volatility equally well across the three decades. The R
2s are lower for the
1990s. Of greater interest is the significance of other variables in the specification for the
1990s. Total debt and M2/GDP are found to be significant for the sample covering the last
decade. The R
2s of these two latter variables in regressions without reserves and openness
however are low, suggesting that these variables offer only limited additional information
in explaining reserve volatility.14
Reserve Volatility without Reserves
The dominance of reserves in Table 1 may be criticized on the grounds of reverse
causality in equation (1). While we do not have a direct test for the simultaneity problem,
two routes are taken to tackle this issue. The first is to offer empirical results without
reserves and to determine whether our previous findings still hold. The second is to
consider alternative measures of reserve volatility that adjust for reserves and test for the
significance of reserves as a control variable.
When the level of reserves are dropped from the cross-country regression, the
results in Table 1 hold.
9 Column 2 in Table 1 show regression results where openness
without reserves is highly significant across all samples and is able to explain a
considerable share of reserve volatility. The positive correlation between reserve volatility
and openness suggests that more open countries are exposed to external shocks and this
is reflected in higher reserve fluctuations. The results (not shown) find that again
monetary and financial variables do not enter the final cross-country specification. To
note, however, is the significance of GDP per capita for the 1981-1990 period and FDI and
country credit ratings matter for the 1991-2000 period.
An alternative way to understand the influence of reserves in the Table 1 is to
adjust VolRes for average reserves i.e., VolRes* = ln(std dev(∆ RESi)/ave(RESi)ave(GDPi))
and VolRes** = ln(std dev(∆ RESi)/ave(∆ ln RESi)ave(GDPi)). The two definitions of volatility
embed a standard volatility measure with average reserves and their change. The latter
definition may be interpreted as an inverse sharp ratio, which attempts to adjust a return
by its risk. To see whether the specifications of Table 1 are robust to these alternative
measures of reserve volatility, the same regressions were rerun with VolRes* and
VolRes**.
10 The results (not shown) find that reserves remain significant for each of the
three sample periods, except VolRes** for the 1980s. The result that countries with higher
reserve levels observe higher reserve volatility holds also for VolRes* and VolRes**. The
                                        
9 The full set of regressions results are available upon request.
10 The regression results are available upon request.15
other findings that financial variables and monetary variables do not matter and that the
specification for the 1990s differs from the earlier periods remain valid.
4. Cross Country Results with Event and Regime Variables
The main results in the previous section find that reserves and openness are the
most important control variables explaining reserve volatility in the long run. In this
section, we relax our prior of γ == =0 = in equation (1) and test the hypothesis that reserves
and openness explain reserve volatility better than the indicator variables used to predict
crisis episodes and changes in exchange rate regimes.
Table 2 presents the results for the crisis indexes of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and
Glick and Hutchison (1999) with reserves and openness. The evidence finds that openness
and reserves remain significant in the presence of the crisis indexes and that the newly
introduced variables do not explain reserve volatility in cross-country regressions. The
indexes are insignificant with or without the control variables and their coefficients
exhibit no clear pattern. These results hold for all samples and are independent of the
index type.
The cross-country results with the de facto exchange rate classifications are given
in Table 3. The empirical results for the index for de facto classifications is mixed at best.
While the coefficients for the de facto indexes are correctly signed (i.e., the greater is the
commitment to defend a given value for the exchange; the larger is reserve volatility -
positive correlation in the case of the Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger index and negative in the
case of the Glick-Wihlborg index), the evidence for its significance is weak. The Levy-
Yeyati-Sturzenegger index is exchange rate index is significant at the 5% critical level in
the regressions for the 1990s, whereas the Glick-Wihlborg index is significant in only one
regression covering the three samples.16
5. Panel Estimation: Short- and Long-Run Determinants
A possible reason why the proxy variables for crisis episodes and de facto exchange
rate regimes are insignificant in the cross-country regressions is simply that key episodes
get washed out through averaging. Although our primary focus is on identifying the long-
run determinants of reserve volatility, we are also interested in whether our cross-country
results for openness and the level of reserves hold equally well in a setting that captures
better the short-run factors. Panel estimation allows crises episodes to have a stronger
impact on reserve volatility, enabling a comparison with the earlier cross-country
estimates. The annual panel considers the control variables, reserves and openness,
together with the de facto classifications and the crisis indexes from Tables 2 and 3.
The (unbalanced) panel estimates for fixed effects are given in Table 4.
11 The
results can be summarized as follows. First, the panel estimates show that reserves and
openness continue to be the most important explanatory variables for reserve volatility
even in the presence of the event and regime variables. The variables of interest are
significant in each of the panel regressions. This shows that the significance of reserves
and openness is not dependent on the data averaging used in the cross-country analysis.
Second, the control variables explain roughly 55% of the annual fluctuations in reserve
volatility. In the best case, the crisis indexes are able to explain only 22% of the
movements in reserve volatility in regressions that exclude openness and reserves. This
result says that when analyzing reserve volatility across countries it is important to
control for openness and the level of reserves even in the short run.
6. Summary and Policy Implications
The importance of reserve volatility arises in different policy discussions. The
analysis centers primarily on the ability of reserve volatility and other information to
signal specific crisis episodes in the short run. The objective of this paper instead focuses
on understanding the contributing factors important in explaining reserve volatility in the
                                        
11 The results for the random effects specification yield similar results.17
long run. The question is of relevance because country specific variables such as the
degree of openness are not considered in the indexes of Levy Yeyati-Sturzenegger (1999)
or Calvo and Reinhart (2002) when making comparative statements about a country's
fluctuations in reserves. Obviously, if long-run factors are responsible for explaining
reserve volatility, then the signaling analysis even for the short run may be biased when
such information is omitted. Our cross country and panel estimates suggest that this is
the case.
Two empirical findings for practitioners emerge from our cross-country estimates.
The first is that reserve volatility is dominated by two variables: the level of reserves and
the degree of openness. Both variables, which are omitted from construction of the crisis
and regime indexes, are positively correlated with reserve volatility and explain 50% to
70% of the cross-country differences in reserve volatility for the post-Bretton Woods
period. The control variables proxying monetary and financial development yield limited
additional information at best. Our regression results are indirectly supported by other
cross-country studies seeking to uncover the determinants of the average level of
reserves. The buffer stock studies by Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) and others find that
the first and second moment of reserves are highly correlated with each other, whereas
Lane and Burke (2001) stress the importance of openness in explaining a country's
reserves.
The second empirical finding pertains to the short and long-run analysis for reserve
volatility. To understand reserve volatility and its indicator properties one must be careful
when making short-run and long-run comparisons. Crisis episodes, whether defined as
banking or currency crises, are not found to be a contributing factor for reserve volatility
in the cross-country estimates using averaged data. Panel estimates using annual data
instead show that several crisis indexes enter as important short-run determinants of
reserve volatility along with reserves and openness. These issues of dynamics are
important for understanding the arguments put forth by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Levy
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999) and others that seek to explain credibility problems for
specific emerging market economies based on reserve volatility. Our empirical results show
however that the practitioner needs to take into account the size of a country's reserves18
and the degree of openness regardless when making short and long-run comparisons about
a countries exchange rate regime based on reserve volatility.19
References
Aizenman, Joshua and Nancy Marion (2002), 'Reserve Uncertainty and the Supply of
International Credit,' Journal of Money Credit and Banking 34(3) Part 1, pp. 631-649.
Bekaert, Geert and Campbell R. Harvey (2000), 'Foreign Speculators and Emerging Equity
Markets,' Journal of Finance 55, 565-614.
Ben-Bassat, Avraham (1980), 'The Optimal Composition of Foreign Exchange Reserves,'
Journal of International Economics 10, pp. 285-295.
Calvo, Guillermo A., Carmen M. Reinhart (2002), 'Fear of Floating', Quarterly Journal of
Economics CXVII, pp. 379-408.
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini (1998), 'Paper Tiger? A Model of
the Asian Crisis, 'National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper: 6783.
Cottarelli, Carlo and Carlo Giannini (1997), 'Credibility without Rules? Monetary
Frameworks in the Post-Bretton Woods Era,' IMF Occasional Paper: 154.
Cukierman, Alex (1992), 'Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and
Evidence,' Cambridge Mass. and London: MIT Press.
Cukierman, Alex, Steven B. Webb, Bilin Neyapti (1992), 'Measuring of the Independence of
Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes,' The World Bank Economic Review 6(3):
353-398.
Feldstein, Martin (2002), 'Economic and Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies:
Overview of Prevention and Management,' National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper: 8837.
Flood, Robert and Nancy Marion (2001), 'Holding of International Reserves In an Era of
High Capital Mobility,' paper presented at the Brookings Trade Forum on May 10-11, 2001.
Frenkel, Jacob and Boyan Jovanovic (1981), 'Optimal International Reserves: A Stochastic
Framework,' Economic Journal 91(June), pp. 507-514.
Frankel, Jeffrey and David Romer (1999), 'Does Trade Cause Growth?,' American Economic
Review 89, pp. 379-399.
Glick, Reuven and Michael Hutchison (1999), 'Banking and Currency Crises: How Common
Are They?,' mimeo.
Glick, Reuven and Clas G. Wihlborg (1997), 'Real Exchange Rate Regimes and International
Trade,' in Cohen Benjamin (editor) International Trade and Finance, New Frontiers for
Research, Essays in Honor of Peter Kenen, Cambridge University Press.
Goldfajn, Ilan and Rodrig O. Valdes (1997), 'Capial Flows and the Twin Crises: The Role of
Liquidity,' IMF Working Paper WP/97/87.
Kaminsky, Graciela L. Carmen M. Reinhart (1999), 'The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking
and Balance-of-Payments Problems,' American Economic Review 89(3), pp. 473-500.20
Lane, Philip R. and Dominic Burke (2001), 'The Empirics of Foreign Reserves,' Open
Economies Review 12(4), pp. 423-434.
Lee, Jang-Yung (1997), 'Sterlizing Capital Inflows,' International Monetary Fund Economic
Issues 7.
Levy Yeyati, Eduardo and Federico Sturzenegger (1999), 'Classifying Exchange Rate
Regimes: Deeds vs. Words,' mimeo.
Mauro, Paolo (1995), 'Corruption and Growth,' Quarterly Journal of Economics CX, pp. 681-
711.
Neely, Christopher J. (2000), 'Are Changes in Foreign Exchange Reserves Well Correlated
with Official Intervention?,' Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, (September/October)
pp. 17-31.
Nugée, John (2000), 'Foreign Exchange Reserves Management,' Centre for Central Banking
Studies, Bank of England Handbooks in Central Banking No. 19.
Perrault, Jean-Francois (2002), 'Private Capital Flows to Emerging-Market Economies,' Bank
of Canada Review Spring, pp. 33-43.
Reinhart, Carmen (2002), 'Default, Currency Crises and Sovereign Credit Ratings,' National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper: 8738.
Reinhart, Carmen (2000), 'The Mirage of Floating Exchange Rates,' American Economic
Review May.
Sherwin, Murray (2000), 'Foreign Reserves: Some Observations in an Asian Context -
Current Issues in Reserves Management for Asian Central Banks,' speech given to a
conference of the World Bank, Bangkok, Thailand May 9, 2000.21
Appendix
A1. Sample of Emerging Market Countries
Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, China, Hongkong, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,




Short-term debt is the natural log of average short-term debt in percent of total
debt. (Source World Bank (2001) Global Development Finance CD-Rom ).
Total debt is the natural log of average total debt divided by average GNP. (Source
World Bank (2001) Global Development Finance CD-Rom ).
Foreign direct investment is defined as the natural log of average foreign direct
investment divided by average GDP. (Source IMF line 78bed).
Current account is defined as the natural log of average current account divided by
average GDP. (Source IMF line 78ald).
Capital account is defined as the natural log of average capital account divided by
average GDP. (Source IMF line 78bcd).
Country credit rating is from Institutional Investor for years 1980, 1985, 1990,
1995, 2001.
Export volatility is defined as ln(std dev(∆ Exports)/ave(GDP)). (Source IMF lines
70, 99bc).
Monetary Variables
Interest rate is the average three-month interest rate (i.e., ln(ave ii,t). The
frequency is monthly (Source IMF line 60c).
Interest rate volatility is defined as the natural logarithm of the standard deviation
of the monthly change in the three-month interest rate over time (i.e., ln(std dev(∆ ii,t)).
(Source IMF line 60c).
Exchange rate volatility is defined as logarithm of the standard deviation of the
monthly change in the exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar (i.e.ln(std dev(∆
si,t)). (Source IMF line rf).
Capital controls index is taken from Cottarelli and Giannini (1997). The index is an
average over the different periods.
Exchange rate system index is +1 for fixed and 0 for flexible exchange rate systems.
The index, which is an average over the different periods, is taken from Cottarelli and
Giannini (1997).22
Financial Development Variables
Financial Development is measured in three ways. The first uses M2/GDP (source
IMF line 35, 99b. The second uses the financial innovation dates from Bekaert and Harvey
(2000). The third is proxied by the insurance premium density and insurance premium
penetration. Premium density is defined as premium volume per capita, whereas premium
penetration is the premium volume in percentage of GDP. Premium density and
penetration are both published yearly by Swiss Re's research department.
Structural Variables
GDP per capita is ln(ave GDP/ave Population). (Source IMF line 99b.c, 99z).
Population density is specified as ln(ave Population/country size).
Openness is defined in two ways. The first uses the Frankel-Romer index (1999)
denoted as Openness (FR) in the tables. This captures the natural level of trade openness
by using the sum of the predicted bilateral trade shares from the geographical
determinants in a gravity model. The measure is the ratio imports to GDP, which is
defined as the natural log of average imports over average GDP. This variable is denoted
as Openness (Import/GDP) in the tables. (Source IMF line 71, 99bc).
Central bank independence, both indexes for non industrial countries are taken from
Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992).
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Figure 1: Monthly Percentage Change in Foreign Exchange Reserves24
 
Table 1: Reserve Volatility and Long-Run Contributing Factors (Estimation: OLS Cross-Country)

























































2 0.688 0.294 0.681 0.687 0.517 0.624 0.568 0.693 0.631 0.720 0.694 0.574
degrees of freedom 24 25 23 23 15 16 8 23 21 21 23 19
   






















































































2 0.659 0.407 0.665 0.734 0.724 0.691 0.670 0.712 0.719 0.731 0.678 0.634
degrees of freedom 27 27 26 26 25 20 19 9 20 24 18 18
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.25
 
Table 1 (Continued): Reserve Volatility and Long-Run Contributing Factors  












































































2 0.504 0.549 0.610 0.599 0.620 0.615 0.639 0.596 0.594 0.598 0.672
degrees of freedom 28 28 27 26 26 21 20 20 19 20 26
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.26
 
   
















































2 -0.029 0.679 0.430 -0.038 0.622 0.377 0.043 0.606 0.398 -0.026 0.669 0.463
degrees of freedom 27 26 26 21 20 20 21 20 20 27 26 26
 
















































2 -0.031 0.486 0.543 -0.032 0.584 0.552 -0.029 0.603 0.560 -0.026 0.515 0.562
degrees of freedom 28 27 27 22 21 21 22 21 21 28 27 27
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.
 
Table 2: Reserve Volatility and Crisis Indexes (Estimation: OLS Cross-Country)
















































2 -0.023 0.637 0.267 -0.252 0.617 0.241 -0.008 0.653 0.341 -0.038 0.696 0.274
degrees of freedom 23 22 22 19 18 18 19 18 18 24 23 2327
 
Table 3: Reserve Volatility and De Facto Exchange Rate Indexes (Estimation: OLS Cross-Country)
















































2 -0.028 0.693 0.281 0.084 0.700 0.339 -0.028 0.464 0.163 0.208 0.713 0.243
degrees of freedom 22 21 21 24 23 23 25 24.000 24 21 20 20
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level. For the sample 1973 - 1980, Openness (FR) is used.28
 
Table 4: Panel (Fixed Effect) Estimates of Long and Short-Run Factors of Reserve Volatility
   














































(GH) Currency Crisis I.
0.3115*  
(0.0535)
(GH) Banking Crisis I.
0.1701*  
(0.0497)




















2 0.577 0.598 0.592 0.580 0.612 0.674 0.580 0.525 0.600 0.587
degrees of freedom 715 710 504 504 632 338 587 160 656 549
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.